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 EDITORIAL 
Amid the political turmoil following the United Kingdom's popular vote on 'Brexit', 
the United Kingdom Supreme Court has recently handed down its highly-anticipated 
ruling in Miller. This judgment conveys remarkable insights about the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court's perception of the relationship between the national and 
European legal orders. We invited Oliver Garner, a Ph.D. researcher at the Law 
Department of the European University Institute working on the legal ramifications 
of 'Brexit' and an editor of our journal, to write an editorial on the implications of 
this ruling. Oliver puts the ruling in a broader perspective, comparing it to two other 
recent national court decisions: Dansk Industri from the Danish Supreme Court and 
Taricco from the Italian Constitutional Court.  
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I. Introduction 
On 6th December 2016, the Danish Supreme Court delivered its judgment in 
the Dansk Industri case.1 Just over six weeks later, on the 24th January 2017, the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court delivered its highly-anticipated judgment 
on the UK Government's appeal in the Miller litigation.2 Two days later, the 
Italian Constitutional Court issued a second preliminary reference to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in the ongoing Taricco saga.3 These 
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three judgments have arisen in divergent factual contexts within three 
Member States that stand at diverse points of relation to the ongoing project 
of European integration. However, despite these differences, I will argue that 
the three judgments converge on the point of constitutional principle which 
they address: situating the exact borders between the constitutional orders 
of the Member States, and the Union's own 'autonomous'4 constitutional 
order. Consequently, through a novel application of the theoretical 
framework of Hans Lindahl,5 this editorial will seek to explain the manner in 
which these decisions have sought to square the circle between the primacy 
of European Union law and the borders and identity of the national 
constitutional order.6 Ironically, it will be concluded that the court of the 
Member State which finds itself facing the exit door of the Union, the United 
Kingdom, has established its national constitutional boundaries in a manner 
which is most conducive to the coherence of the European Union's legal 
order. 
II. The Facts and the Question at Stake 
The facts of the Danish case 'appear trivial'7 at first glance as they concern a 
singular employment related pecuniary claim rather than an issue affecting 
society at large. The deceased claimant fell within the scope of the conditions 
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under Paragraph 2a(1) of the Danish Law on salaried employers for 
entitlement to a severance allowance following his job dismissal. However, 
under Paragraph 2a(3) of the Law, his concurrent entitlement to an old-age 
pension invalidated his severance entitlement despite his continuing in 
employment. Consequently, on referral of the case via preliminary reference, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union ('CJEU' or the 'Court of Justice') 
held that withholding this severance payment violated the unwritten general 
principle of EU law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age.8 Thus, the 
case came back before the Danish Supreme Court to apply this interpretation 
of EU law in its final decision on the merits.  
The facts of the United Kingdom Miller case, by stark contrast, could not be 
further from being politically trivial. They concerned the seismic political 
upheaval of the Member State's withdrawal from the European Union. 
Specifically, the claimant had filed an application for judicial review to clarify 
the exact means by which the United Kingdom executive could fulfil the 
domestic 'constitutional requirements' outlined in Article 50(1) Treaty on 
European Union ('TEU') for providing notification of a decision to withdraw. 
The United Kingdom government argued that it was entitled to exercise the 
executive prerogative power without parliamentary oversight to give 
notification. They argued that this was because the United Kingdom's 
membership of the EU, or of any other treaty regime, concerned the realm of 
relations between sovereign states governed by international law. By 
contrast, the claimant argued that the specific nature of EU law, which 
provides substantive rights to individuals in the national sphere, means that 
it constitutes a form of domestic law. The argument followed that the 
government was prevented from exercising the prerogative to trigger Article 
50 because to do so would be changing the law of the land without the consent 
of Parliament. This would violate constitutional principles established since 
the 18th century. Following a decision for the claimants in the Divisional 
Court, the appeal came before the Supreme Court under an unprecedented 
amount of public interest both within the United Kingdom and in the rest of 
Europe. 
Falling somewhere in the middle of these two extremes on the scale of 
political and societal salience, the facts of the Taricco litigation concern the 
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limitation periods within which an individual may be prosecuted for VAT 
fraud under Italian law. The referring Italian court considered that the 
brevity of these periods may have breached the obligation under EU law to 
take measures to counteract illegal activities affecting the financial interests 
of the European Union.9 Upon preliminary reference, the CJEU held that 
national limitation provisions that may exempt perpetrators of fraud from 
punishment are incompatible with the Court's interpretation of the 
obligations under Article 325 Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union ('TFEU').10 In so doing, the Luxembourg court also held that its 
prescription for national courts to refrain from applying such limitation 
provisions would not amount to a breach of legality under Article 49 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.11 Thus, the case had 
to be determined nationally. However, due to the fact that the Italian 
Constitutional Court's interpretation of the principle of legality as indeed 
applicable to procedural issues stands in direct conflict with the CJEU's 
interpretation, both the Court of Appeal of Milan and the Italian Supreme 
Court made references to the Constitutional Court to determine whether 
disapplication would violate the national constitution. The Constitutional 
Court has subsequently taken the unusual step of referring the case back to 
the Court of Justice once more. 
The facts of these cases have arisen in Member States with differing 
relationships to the project of European integration. To apply an analogy 
deriving from one of Florence's most famous sons,12 the United Kingdom 
currently finds itself within the Purgatorio between a popular vote in a 
national referendum to withdraw from the Union and the formal notification 
under Article 50 TEU to commence the withdrawal proceedings. After either 
the negotiation of a withdrawal treaty or two years, failing a vote by the 
European Council for extension of the negotiation period, the Member State 
will take the final descent into the Inferno of its relationship with the 
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European Union. The United Kingdom has often found itself accompanied 
by the Kingdom of Denmark in its position as an awkward partner in the 
European project. After their respective accessions in 1973, both Member 
States have secured numerous opt-outs from the acquis communautaire at 
treaty amendments. This has been accompanied by rejections of further 
integration into the European constitutional order by the Danish population 
in 199213 and 2015.14 This hesitance of the Danish executive and people 
towards further EU integration, but without taking the ultimate step towards 
withdrawal, means that Denmark may also be regarded as situated in the 
Purgatorio between full European integration and fragmentation. To 
complete the Divine Comedy allusion, the Republic of Italy may be 
perceived to flourish in Paradiso in its relations with Europe. One of the 
'Original Six' signatories of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European 
Economic Community in 1957, Italy's engagement with the European Union 
constitutional order is argued to be so essential that integration has been 
described as 'fulfilment of the national constitution'.15  
The Dansk Industri, Miller, and Taricco judgments have arisen from different 
factual contexts. However, at the abstract level, all three judgments concern 
the fundamental question of the interaction between separate yet 
intertwined constitutional orders. Therefore, a move to the theory of how 
legal orders define their boundaries can provide the framework with which it 
is possible to explain exactly how the three national courts confronted the 
claims of the European constitutional order. 
III. Borders, Limits, and Fault-Lines: The Legal Theory of Hans Lindahl 
In his 2013 monograph, Hans Lindahl provides a three-way distinction 
between 'boundaries', 'limits', and 'fault-lines' in legal ordering.16 The first 
concept refers to how law orders behaviour within a normative community 
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by setting its spatial, temporal, material, and subjective boundaries. The 
author goes on to outline that such ordering cannot create the unity of a legal 
order unless this order is necessarily limited. Thus, boundaries manifest 
themselves as 'limits' when they are called upon to exclude certain 
phenomena as either 'legal' or 'illegal'. Crucially, however, Lindahl challenges 
the dichotomy between legal and illegal by introducing a third category –'a-
legality'. Such a-legal phenomena question how a legal order sets the 
boundaries that give shape to the distinction between legality and illegality.17 
A-legality has both 'weak' and 'strong dimensions'. Phenomena of the former 
character emerge from the domain of the unordered, yet in principle are 
orderable by the legal collective.18 By contrast, the latter dimension concerns 
a normative challenge that a legal collective cannot accommodate either as 
legal or as illegal by reformulating its limits.19 Therefore, to return to the 
constitutive function of borders, Lindahl argues that in its strong dimension, 
a-legality no longer summons a collective to shift the limit between legal 
(dis)order and the unordered, but instead lays bare a 'fault-line' between what 
a collective can order – the orderable – and what it cannot order – the 
unorderable.20 Following the lead of Kaarlo Tuori's insightful application of 
Lindahl's theory to conflicts between national and EU law in general, 21 I will 
seek to use the framework to explain the specific cases arising from 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Italy.  
IV. Explaining the Borders Confrontation between the National and European 
Order 
Viewed through Lindahl's conceptual lens, the key question underlying all 
three cases is: Where are the borders of jurisdiction between the Member 
State constitutional orders and the European Union constitutional order, 
and how are they determined? The three national courts provided divergent 
answers to these questions. The Danish Supreme Court refused to follow the 
CJEU's preliminary ruling and disapply the provision of national law when 
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Transnational Legal Theory, 133-153. 
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deciding the merits of the case. Therefore, it can be argued that the Danish 
Supreme Court in Dansk Industri regarded the clash between the applicable 
EU law and the national legislation as the strong form of a-legality, which thus 
means that the claims of EU law were 'unorderable'. The Danish court 
concludes that the Law on Accession, through which EU law is made 
enforceable within the Danish constitutional order, 'does not provide the 
legal basis to allow the unwritten principle prohibiting discrimination on the 
grounds of age to take precedence over Paragraph 2a(3) of the Law on salaried 
employees in so far as the provision is contrary to the prohibition.'22 The 
Danish court further reiterates that it would be 'acting outside the scope of 
its powers as a judicial authority if it were to disapply the provision in this 
situation'.23 Consequently, to co-opt the famous phrase24 applied to the 
German Constitutional Court, the Danish court has not only barked, but has 
bitten. It has found in Dansk Industri that it would be acting ultra vires if it 
were to disapply the national law provisions. Therefore, it has established the 
fault-line of the national constitutional order beyond which the European 
legal order cannot pass. Tuori has outlined his perception that 'the principles 
of primacy, unity and efficacy form part of the constitutional identity of EU 
law'.25 Consequently, the decision by a national court to refuse to accept the 
primacy of a norm of EU law when in conflict with a national provision can 
also be argued to trespass beyond the concurrent fault-lines of the EU 
constitutional order. 
In contrast to Dansk Industri, the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Miller 
was not confronted with the claim that any singular norm of the European 
Union legal order was incompatible with a norm of the national legal order. 
Instead, in deciding the question at hand, it saw fit to outline the holistic 
status of the entire source of EU law within the United Kingdom's 
constitutional order. Nevertheless, the manner in which the majority 
judgment drew the boundaries between the national and European orders 
provides an indication of how the UK court would have dealt with an 
individual conflict of norms in a different manner to the Danish court. In 
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developing its own version of the 'Solange' doctrine,26 the court set a 
procedural limit to the relationship between the European and national 
constitutional orders, in contrast to the substantive limits arguably created by 
both the German and Danish courts. Whereas the latter courts have held 
that EU law may be held to be ultra vires if it intrudes upon the substance of 
fundamental rights protection in national constitutional law, the United 
Kingdom approach outlines that EU law could only be inapplicable in the 
national constitutional order if the constitutional procedure by which it is 
authorised were to be amended. 
The UK Supreme Court details that the effect of the European Communities 
Act 1972 is that 'EU law not only becomes a source of UK law, but actually 
takes precedence over all domestic sources of UK law, including statutes'.27 
However, this recognition of the primacy of EU law is not unconditional; 
instead, the court outlines that 'consistently with the principle of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, this unprecedented state of affairs will only last so 
long as Parliament wishes: the 1972 Act can be repealed like any other 
statute'.28 Therefore, the Supreme Court has drawn the 'limits' of the United 
Kingdom's accommodation of the European Union along procedural lines: 
The condition of the European Communities Act remaining in force means 
that all norms of EU law will have primacy over conflicting national norms. 
At the same time, however, the court does not recognise the final supremacy 
of the source of EU law precisely because its effect is predicated on the 
enabling national law. As the majority judgment outlines: '[T]he content of 
the rights, duties and rules introduced into our domestic law as a result of the 
1972 Act is exclusively a question of EU law. However, the constitutional process 
by which the law of the United Kingdom is made is exclusively a question of 
domestic law'.29  
Applying the first-limb of this statement, the argument can be made that if 
the United Kingdom Supreme Court had been confronted with the Dansk 
                                                 
26 See https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/01/31/oliver-garner-conditional-primacy-
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(last accessed 20 March 2017);  
27 Miller (n 2), para. 60. 
28 ibid (emphasis added). 
29 ibid para. 62 (emphasis added). 
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Industri conflict of norms, it would have held that the status of the EU law 
norm would require the national court to disapply the conflicting national 
law, as this conflict is 'exclusively a question of EU law'. Furthermore, this 
conclusion would not be affected by the nature of the norm as an 'unwritten 
principle' that is a 'judicial creation'. Further along in the judgment, the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court recognises the obligation of UK courts to 
comply with the Court of Justice of the European Union's interpretation of 
EU law.30 Consequently, in contrast to the Danish Supreme Court, the UK 
Supreme Court may be held to have situated the 'fault-line' of the United 
Kingdom constitutional order not in any substantive border that EU law 
norms are not authorised to cross, but instead in the procedural feature that 
the source of law's effect remains predicated on the enabling domestic law. 
'So long as the 1972 Act remains in force, its effect is to constitute EU law an 
independent and overriding source of domestic law'.31 The judgment in Miller 
also illuminates the question of who should answer the question of setting 
fault-lines. By recognising that the ultimate validity of EU law depends on the 
repeal of the enabling statute, it can be argued that the court defers the 
ultimate question of the fault-lines of the constitutional order to the 
legislature and the political process. 
Although the German Constitutional Court's 'Solange' judgments are the 
most famous examples of the boundary establishing role of Member State 
courts, it was in fact the Italian Constitutional Court which first established 
its own progenitor – the doctrine of 'counter-limits' (contro limiti).32 In the 
same judgment33 in which Article 11 of the Constitution was identified as 
Italy's own 'conduit pipe'34 by which EU law norms are made nationally 
enforceable, the Constitutional Court held that 'this mechanism would 
operate only if one crucial condition is met: that EU law complies with the 
protection of fundamental rights.'35 Thus, like the German and Danish courts 
and unlike the United Kingdom court, the Italian constitutional order sets 
substantive limits to the status of EU law. Despite the establishment of such 
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limits, the Italian Constitutional Court has never even barked, let alone 
bitten. Fabbrini and Pollicino outline that the court 'never invoked such 
limits in practice: on the contrary [the Constitutional Court] developed a 
constructive dialogue with the ECJ, aimed at emphasizing the common 
constitutional tradition of Europe more than the specific identify of Italy'.36 
The evocative claims that European integration functions as fulfilment of the 
Italian constitution can also be regarded through Lindahl's insights 
concerning the 'normative point',37 which provides orientation for the 
ordering of limits. The claimed receptiveness to the integration of Italian 
constitutional identity may suggest that the normative point of the legal 
order is not threatened by the presence of norms deriving from the European 
legal order but is instead reinforced by it. 
This dialogical approach can help to explain why in Taricco the Italian 
Constitutional Court has not conclusively settled the drawing of the 
boundaries of the national constitutional order for itself but has instead 
referred back to the European court in this endeavour. Tuori's comments on 
how conflicts may be resolved within Lindahl's conceptual framework are 
appropriate. He details that acceptance may be possible if one of the parties 
to the conflict does not regard the conflict in terms of an irresolvable fault-
line and thus is willing to shift its limits. 38 Thus, the Italian Constitutional 
Court has not crossed the same Rubicon as the Danish Supreme Court by 
firmly establishing its fault-lines through a refusal to disapply national law. 
However, its request for 'revisitation'39 by the Court of Justice can be 
interpreted as a request for the Luxembourg court to 'back down' by 
adjusting its own limits in a 'last attempt to avoid a constitutional collision 
between the two legal orders'.40 The fact that following the preliminary ruling 
the case will again come back to the national legal order for decision means 
that the Italian court will then have the final word on the extent to which it 
                                                 
36 ibid 2. 
37 Such a normative point of a collective concerns 'that which our action ought to be 
about', Lindahl (n 5), 90. 
38 Tuori (n 21), 151. 
39 http://verfassungsblog.de/the-taricco-decision-a-last-attempt-to-avoid-a-clash-
between-eu-law-and-the-italian-constitution/ (last accessed 20 March 2017). 
40 ibid. 
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will compromise in the drawing of its limits in light of the European court's 
own boundary setting. 
V. Conclusion: The Broader Picture 
One may well argue that broader contextual factors removed from legal 
doctrine have played a key role in the different decisions delivered in Dansk 
Industri, Miller, and Taricco. Regarding the first judgment, Madsen, Olsen, 
and Šadl ruminate on the possible explanatory causation of changes in the 
composition of the bench in Copenhagen.41 On Miller, one may ponder 
whether the United Kingdom's current precarious position on the steps to 
the exit door of the European Union informed the boldness with which the 
Supreme Court detailed the conditional primacy of EU law. Following 
withdrawal, the Court will no longer be confronted with the form of conflicts 
that have arisen in Denmark and Italy; instead its dicta will become a 
footnote in the history of the United Kingdom's doomed European Union 
membership.42 Finally, in the Italian context, the receptiveness towards the 
European Union in the rhetoric of the Presidents of the Republic43 may have 
created a pressure upon the Court not to give bite to its counter-limits 
doctrine. This is reinforced by the holistic approach of regarding the 
President of the Republic and the Constitutional Court as both fulfilling key 
roles as guardians of the Italian constitution.44 
However, I would argue that the value of applying conceptual frameworks 
such as Hans Lindahl's to legal phenomena such as the decisions in these 
cases is that it may equip legal scholars with the tools to provide prior doctrinal 
explanations for different approaches. This may allow at least an attempt to 
                                                 
41 Madsen et al. (n 7). 
42 See discussion in http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/01/26/so-long-as-and-farewell-the-
united-kingdom-supreme-court-in-miller/ (last accessed 20 March 2017). 
43 For example, former President Ciampi's rhetoric that the EU has been 'from its 
origins a polity; a land of rights; a constitutional reality which does not contrast with 
our beloved national Constitutions, but rather connects them and complements 
them. It is a polity which does not turn down the identity of our nation States but 
rather strengthens them.' (translation from Fabbrini and Pollicino (n 15), 6.) 
44 See discussion in Fabbrini and Pollicino (n 15). 
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give a 'pure'45 legal account before moving, through a contextual approach, to 
the no less important extra-legal factors which influence judicial decisions 
Thus, it may be concluded that in these particular cases the distinction in the 
manner in which the respective national courts demarcate their boundaries – 
substantive in Denmark and Italy, procedural in the United Kingdom – has 
informed the different approaches of these courts towards the relationship 
between the national constitutional order and the European constitutional 
order. Ironically, this means that the judiciary of the Member State in which 
the polity has voted to withdraw from European integration have settled the 
boundaries of the national legal order in a manner that is the most 
accommodating towards, and respectful of, the coherence and integrity of 
the European constitutional order. Indeed, to revisit and reshuffle the 
analogy with Dante's Divine Comedy, the UK Supreme Court's approach 
may be regarded as Paradiso for the primacy claims of the EU legal order, the 
Danish Supreme Court's establishment of a strong fault-line can be seen as 
Inferno, whereas the Italian Constitutional Court's double-referral suggests 
that the resolution of the case resides in Purgatorio. Although Miller may be 
the twilight of the UK Supreme Court's engagement with the European 
Union legal order, its salience may live on beyond the borders of the United 
Kingdom through providing inspiration to the other Member State courts 
when confronted with the issues of borders, limits, and fault-lines. 
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